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The Revolutionary ~ c t '  

PREFACE. 
Zn vim of recent evmts, this thesis by Fmdtrick 
hgds, appearing as an introddon to one of Karl 
Marx's pamphlets, "The Class struggles in F w ,  
r 848-1 850,'' m c s  at this time like st mice of warning 
fmm the tomb. For years past, the dkwaion hm 
been going on, among groups which d ~ Y C B  
revolutionary, as to the proper tad- for ammplieb- 
ing thc Rmldoa;  whether the Rmlrrtion could Bc 
rmornpfished peacefully or of necessitg would have to 
be brought about by bloodshed, whether tho political 
ballot U e d  by an adequate industrial force wan d- 
&cat to aqomplish the RemllPeion: ot whether military 
prcparationa and the necessary psychologid attitude 
were indinpensable prerequisites to mabfe the working 
dam to bring the Revolution about; whether indecd the 
poli id ballot and its oocompmP;ng political agitation 
bwt m y  d u e  whatsoever as a revolutionary m a p n  
of thc working claw. 
The physical-fad, avowed mad&, and veiltd 
dynamiters, made a disptoportionate amount of 
and co~ld~qucntly were able to h d  their way into thc 
ncwapapcr colmnns, but from the point of view of 
4 argmncnt, the Socialist Labor Party, advocating 
the cidiaed, the political method, backed by the phys- 
id force of an integrally organized industrial union, 
had held the field against all comers. Anyone driven 
into a corner was usually willing to admit that we were - 
ablutcly right, but . .- . . . 
Then came the Rwsian revolution. By peculiar 
chmstances, which it is not necessav here to tnu- 
merate, the proletarian revolution in Russia was accom- 
plished by an easy coup d'ttat, a victory backed by the 
workers and peasants in arms. As might have been 
q c c t c d ,  this caused all the manhiit and physicd- 
forcirrts' pots through~ut the whole world t~ boil and 
s i d e  until the contents spluttered over into the fire. 
Here was a living armpie, a proletarian revolution, 
the first and only real proletarian revoltdon in the 
world mrritd to a successful issue. How was it done? 
By physical force, by military action; no further proof 
needed ; all revolutions mmt be accomplished by phys- 
ical v i o l e n c d o w  else could they be revolutions at a117 
The political weapon was effeminate, compromisi~g, 
COUNTER-IR~YOLIJTIONAWY. "Maw movementd' "d- 
tary forces," had to be gathered and organiad, even 
though of necessity this had to be done in secret and 
no hidden spot could be found for this extensive m e u -  
vcr larger than a six by eight room, sub-cellam or rat- 
holc9. 
With brains made red hot by the Russian revolu- 
0 f ~ ~ W ~ ~ 0 n l ~ t h e s . L ~ .  I z w ~ ~  - 
nsrd apbt &~Vemh*iv%bee of b d a .  To 
dmrn o i  voice the only ccmEW mmsbty 
wag to shout : ' ' c p n t ' ' '  '$&id wmpmu," "ro 
a d ~ ~ m y ' ~  But hem -= mmn - E n e ~ a m ' s  Lit* 
~aw&er--stn& wfio is mgw fjt Li htc6rct Madam 
- 7 -  
.mrm of capitalism, as enumersrtcd by En&, is true 
several hundred per c a t  at this day and b u r .  Not 
d y  d d  the revolutionary "m~actioriist" be met 
with improved guns and cannons, but with additional 
military impro\.cments that Engels had nwer dreamed 
of; bombs thrown from aeroplanes, tanks, poison gas, 
tear gas and a number of other infernal things now ac- 
cessible for use against the ''rabble rut" of "riotous" 
workmen. 
The fact that Engeb looked to the German Social 
Democracy of his day as the model Socialist political 
oqpaization md that the Social Dmrwracy has sincc, 
at the &a1 moment, proven utterly ineffectual, inade- 
quate, yes, traitorous to the movement, does not alter 
the general truth and sound reasoning of Engets's a r p  
mcnr. Curious enough, it was the Socialist Labor Party, 
the advocate of the civilized political method, that, in 
h e  decade immediatdy before the War, was the most 
severe; yes, perhaps the only red and consistent critic 
of the k i d  Democracy of Germany. This criticism, 
however, was not directed at it because it was political 
but because its leaders had become "socialist" politi- 
cians, parliamentarians, "socialist" reformers, Iog- 
rolling and temporizing with capitalist mi*. We 
criticized the Social Democracy because we perceived 
rhe tendency to swing away from revolutionary s ~ s r l -  
ism, because in exchange for reforms under the present 
system, it was sacrificing the Revolution. It was gatb- 
triag mers by the thousands and mifIions, but the 
- 8 -  
sowd Sacialist education of these voters was k i n g  
neglected. 
Mortovcr, we saw impcndii disaster if the phi- 
cal party was marching onward to political rietory, as 
tbe Social Democraq was marching onward, without 
an adequate orpuized forcc to back up the victory at 
the ballot box. Force, did we say 7 Yes, we did, and 
we did so deliberately. All forcc is not manifested in 
fighting; sometimes, to be sure, the fighting forcc is 
weakness itself. Organized working class force does 
not necessaiily (in fact we should sap under modern 
conditions, as a rule, and certainly not previous to the 
political victory), imply military force. The S o c i a  
h b o r  Party continually warned the &cia1 Democracy 
in the decade before its fall, warned all purely political 
Socialists, that a victory at the ballot box without the 
adequately organized power of the proletariat to back 
it up, would mean tbe dcfeot of the Revolution. 
This organized force of the Proletariat can exist 
only in the Socialist Industrid Union, organized in 
shop and factory, mill and mine, on the railroads and 
other means of communication, every place where the 
economic power of the capitalist holds sway today 
and wherever the worker, by the fact that he is the 
producer, the wielder and operator of the tools of pro- 
duction, ~U and must become the only true source of 
power the moment he is organized in a classconscious 
Socialist Revolutionary Union. 
Tbc working out of this thcory which, applied, con- 

THE REVOLUTIONBRY Am. 
By F U k  w. 
The woWOrk, herewith republished, rcprcscrm Man's 
firat attempt to cxpk'i a segment of mntempororg hb 
tory by means of his materialist mnmption upan the 
baris of the prevailing economic condition. In the k 
munh Manifesto, this theory had bem applied- in 
rough outline to the entire modern history, aad in 
Mtrx'r and my own articles in the New R W c h e  
Zai~lrng it had constantly bctn used for the interprets- 
tion of curreat potitid events. Here, however, it ba- 
crme a mrrtrcr of tracing the inherent c a u ~ I  comedm 
of a devdopmmt crrtcnding over several years which 
wrrs for the whole of Europe as dt id  as it waa typE 
cd, that is, b h & g  back, in the 8mc of tbe author, 
upon pditicd c m t s  the effects of wh~t ,  in the last 
analysis, were economic causes. 
In an attempt to judge events and series of c v d  
taken from cttrrent history; one will ncver be able to 
go bock to the very last economic causes, Evcu in these 
days, when the pwfessiod prem furnishes mattrid so 
copiously, it will be impossible even in Ehgaad rn trace 
the course of industry and commerce in the wodd'a 
market, or to follow the &anpa in prurduchn mtthod, 
'By r h  day in such mmcr  ail to be able to draw at 
my gjwm moment a g a d  c o d s i o n  from these 
highly complicated and evcr changing factors, factors 
of which the most important often work for a long rime 
d c r  cover befort they auddedy and forcibly come 
tu the surface. A clear survey of the economic history 
of a given period can never be gained at the t h e ;  it is 
r .possiMe only later, after the subsequent collection and 
dassomnent of the rniiteriaL Here statistics are M inv 4 
$dispensable aid, but they alwa JS limp behind the event. 
When dealing with current contemporary history one 
1 wiU often be forced to treat this, the most decisive fac- tor, as constant and to consider the cconomit situation found at the beginning of a given period as governing the entire period without variation, or to consider on1 y such changes of the situation as emanate from events plainly visible and &erefore also quite manifest. The materialist method must here too often'conhe itstlf to a traeillg back of political conlicts to the conflicts of 
interests among the social dasscs and class factions of 
I a given ccononiic development, and to prove that the different political parties arc the more or less adequate political expression of  thest same dasses and class fac- tions. It goes without saying that thc inevitable neglect of the simultaneous changes of the economic sitnation, tbc real basis of all the events to be investigated, is 
hwnd to b t  a source of error. But all the conditions 
of a cmprehensivc presentation of the history of the 
&y im+it.b3. k h K i c  of c m 4 i  dctm 
mo one from writing nurcnt history. 
At the time Matx undertook tbir work, the mid 
mum of error was evm far more inevitable. To tmcc 
during the revolutionary p~riod, I 848-49, the sitnuha- 
ncous economic transformations, or to maintain a wr- 
vep of thcm, was plainly impossible. Pmistly so 
during the first months of the ]London exile, in the 
autumn and winter of r 849-50. That was just the time 
when Marx began this work. But dcspitc thew unpm 
pitious cimstanccs, his thorough knowiedgt of the 
economic condition of France, as well as of the political 
history of that country since the February revolution, 
enablcd him to give a presentation of events, which w- 
covered their inner connection in a manner not a k e  
attained, and which trter met, briUiantly, the double 
test that Marx himself subjected thcm to. 
The first test was occasioned by Mam, since the 
sprhg of I 850, again gaining some leisurc for economic 
studies and, as a beginning, taking up the economic his- 
tory of the last ten years. From the facts &cmselvcs 
it bccamt tho'mughly dear to him what, thus far, and 
from the fractional materia! at hand, he had half dc- 
duced o priori: that the world commercial crisis of x 847 
was tht real cause of the February and March rcvoIu- 
tions, and that the industrial prosperity which arrived 
grsldady in the middle of 1848, coming to full bloom 
in 1849 and 1850, was the Pitalizing factor of the re- 
nascent European reaction. This was decisive. WhiIe in 
thc fimt three artides (published in the January-March 
isme of the Nwra Rheidsche ZCitung, " P o l i t i ~ e  
d Review," Hamburg, 1850) the wpeetrrtion of 
m early renewed upward turn of revolutionary energy 
is dl h k c d  for, the historic review, written by Marx 
md myself, and published in the final doubIt number- 
May4hober-which appeared in the autumn of x 850, 
bmb o m  for all with these 3usiollg : "A new revoh 
tiorr is possible only as the consequence of a new crisis. 
And it is dso as certain as the latter:' But that was 
really the only essential change that had to be made. 
h to the interpretation of events, given in former 
pa* as well aa the causal co- therein set forth, 
abmluteIy nothing had to be changed, as is shown by 
the continuation of tbt review covering the period f r m  
Mmtb ro down to the autumn of r 850. T h i s  codnu- 
ation I have included as the fourih article h the present 
The s w n d  test was stiU harder. Immediately af- 
ter IAuis Ronaparte's coup &&tat of Dcccmber z, I 85 x, 
Man worked anew upon thc history of Fmmc from 
Ftbmary, r 848, down to the aforesaid evcnt which, 
t 
for the time being, terminated &c revo1utiomry period. 
*("The Eighteenth Brumaire of Lnuis Boupartc." 
Third Edition, Meissner, Hamburg, '1885.) In this 
brachutt is treated o w  more, though morc briefly, the 
period dealt with in our joint review. Compare this 
I m d  presentation, written in the light of a dcdsiw 
I ~een t  that occurred more than a year later, with own, 
and it will be found that the i u t h m i d  taw b k  
very little. 
What gives to our r t v i ~ ~  o d d d t d l y  a p d 1  aig- 
nificance is the circumstance that, for the &at time, it 
expressed the formtllsr which today, with general ma= 
nimity of the Iabr  pattics of all the colmtrica of tht 
world, briefly summarizes their demand for c a m d c  
reconstruction: thc expropriation of the m a w  of pro- 
d d o n  by mdcty. Ia the acmd chapter, ancnt rbe 
" R i i  to W o w  which is U t e d  as the "first PA- 
ward formula wherehi thc re&lutionary dananda of 
the proletariat are emdenaed," it is said: "But bch'ki 
the Right to Work stolnds the power over crpitd, be- 
hind the power over capital stands the expropridon 
af thc mean8 of pmduchn, their subjection to rhc am+ 
dated warking dm, therefort, the aboIitiQn of wage 
hbor and of capital rrnd of their d rtbtims." 
H- here ia -formdate &for thc Iirst t b d t  
&& whereby modem no& dam Soeilllmm in  a b r p  
ly diflerentiatcd, not only from all the diiferctre sbades 
of fend& bottrge~b, petty hrgcois, ctc, &idam, 
but a h  from the confused notiom of a of 
gmds of tht utopian as well w the o r i w  hbr orrtll. 
mmim. 
If, later, Manr extended the formula to thc w m  
prirrtion of the m e w  of tlrchongc, tbir extamion, wtkh  
became a matter sf nnrrsrt after tflt 
Menifesto, simply mpru~~ed a corohq of the. n#in 
thesis. Same wise pcople in hghwd have ram@ 
added hat  tke "raua, af dbtribuh" sbould dm be 
d g n c d  to aaciety. It would bt &@cult for tbtre gta 
denatn to -Inin what are thtse mcons of distribution 
ae distinct from the mtrm of produceion and exchange 
4 c s s  N t i c a l  meam of distribution arc meant, 
taxes, dots to the poor, including the S~chsem~~ld  
(-ma1 forest) and other endowments. But these, 
in the first place, are means of distribution already in 
the possemion of mciety, the Seatc or the Municipality; 
and, second, it is we who would abolish them. 
* * 
At the time the February revolution began, in so far 
as OUT conception of the conditions and the course of 
revolutionary movmcnts are mnccmcd, we were all 
subject to the prevaiIing historic txpcricnce, notably 
thai of France. It wos just the latter that had dom- 
inated the entire European history since 1789, and f m 
whom now again had corn; the signat for a general 
transformation. And thus, inevitably and as a ma#er 
of course, were our conctptions of the nature and 
course of the "sucial" revolution p r d i e d  in Paris in 
February, r 8 4 ,  the revolution of the proletariat, 
strongly colored by the memory of the prototypes of 
r 789 and x83o. And, h l I y ,  when the Paris uprising 
found .its acbo in the victorious insurrections in Vienna, 
Milan and Berlin; whm aU Europe was drawn into the 
mvernent, all the way to the Russian border; when in 
Junc the first great bade for dominance was fought in 
Prrir between proletariat and bourgeoisie; d e n  even 
the victory of its claw so shattered the burgwide W 
it Bed back into the arms of the same monadiat-fd 
=action that had just been overrhmwn, therc.muld be, 
under the conditions prevailing, no doubt foF ps that 
tbe great decisive struggle was at bad, tbat it d d  
bpvc to be fought to a finish in one long 4 t r t ; o n a g  
pFFiod and with shifting fortunes, but that it mdd end 
d y  in the final victory of the proletariat. 
By no means did we, after the defeats of 1849, 
&are the illusions of vulgar democracy, grouped h 
@rti9#J about tbc provisional future -men& 
Z%ec reckoned with an Wit, once for all M v c  
6ctoryrpof the "people" over its "oppressom";. wc radt-, 
aored with a long struggle, rftcr the &nhtion.of thc 
Y oppressom," among the antagode  clmmat~ cob. 
ecaM among that very "people." Vulgot danocrrcg 
expected a renewed outbreak fm one day to mother; 
we,. already in the autumn of r 854 dedartd tbat the 
6mt phase of thc rmlutionrry period had closed .and 
&at nothing could be looked fornard to onti1 tbc a& 
vent of a new economic world crisis. Wherefore we 
werc banned with bell, book and candle as traitom to 
the revolution by the same people who, later on, almost 
without exception made their peace with Bisrnrrdt- 
in so far as Bismarck considered them worth whiIc. 
But history also proved us in the wrongt a d  r+ 
ngcd our opinion of that day as sn illusion, W i r y  
wmt even farther; nor d y  did it destroy our fomer 
Lr rbo it tramfond completely the conditions 
& rrbieb proletariat will have to battk. Thf a methads of r 848 am today obnulcte in every 
rorpect, d that i s  a point which right here descrpes 
c b r  indgation. 
Hithem, dl remlutiotls impticd the eliminatim o i  
aac form of dlrsa iuIe by a n h e r ;  hitherto, all ruling 
drsKs formed but small minorities as compared with 
tbe rukd popular mass. Whencvcr one minority was 
d r o w n ,  mother minority instead took hold of tht 
reins of power and mnodcled the State ir#tibtionr ae 
=ding to its iatc-. In every instance it waa that 
mimrity grap which, according to the dcgm of ccd 
nomic dtvetoprnent, was. capable and therefore eolled 
q o n  ta rule, on that account and principally, bcnw it 
always happed dirt the rdtd majority either aided 
the d u t i o n  on the side of the ding minority, or at 
i us r  passively tolerated the same. But, leaving aside 
b cix~rcte contents in each cast, the common form of 
d these revolutions was tbat they were minority rev- 
ohtiom. Even when the majority cooperated, it was 
d n n ~ - - ~ d d y  or not-nly in the service of a mi- 
nority; and the latter obtained thcrcby, or cvcn through 
the passive, rtnrcsm&g attitude of tht majority, the 
rpptriinci: of being the representative of rH the p 
pk. 
Afkr the Erst great success, the minority as a rule e: ate  bdf was content with what had bem pined, 
while the other balf, wanting to go further, set up - 
demrnds which in part were rcdy  or apprrdy in 
the b r a t  of the gmrt mass of tbc people. The moa 
mtkddmandswouldinsomtisolr tedco~~bt~ 
fomd, but more ofem d y  for the mwnent: the mate 
d m t e  party d d  again get the upper luad and 
tbatwhichhadbtenwonhstrrrurgaia~inwlrbdc 
or in p ~ ;  the vanquished wodd tbtn hu t  truron sr 
d attribute the defeat to actid- In reality tbe 
hy of chc l a d  was d y  this: the gains of tbt first 
victory wen made scam only thnwgh the d vic- 
borp of tbe r a M  party; wtKnefter Ohat, and thereby 
awrmtnury aetds had been attained, tht rrdimh md 
tbcit -d d  plaish from the -. 
All the more mdcm r c v o ~ ~  beeinn'ms rrkb 
dK gmt E+h repO1ution of the 17th mmry,  ar- 
lulbitrd thue ferttlres which m i n s e p a d c  from 
crcq mlrrtionary s t d e .  They appear appkbl t  
rbo to the *mg&~ of the pmlmriat for .m mn&pa- 
th, ipplicrMc the more so a*mc, jrwt in r848, t h w  
# n d d b c ~ c d w h o c v t n i n a m w r u e r m d e d h  
which direction emancipation was to bc loolrcd for. 
Tbc pro~cclrkn masses tbemsek, evtn'afkr their 
h l i s  victory, were abwr1utcly at sca as to the coarse 
to bc pursued. And yet, thew w the movemen041~ 
d d v e ,  spmmmw, irrepressible. Was not that 
jsiat the aimation wherein the revolution mwt mccted, 
kd by a minority, it is true, but this dmc not in the irt- 
terest of that minority but in the most specific inter- 
of the majority? If in all the longer rcvcrlutionary pc- 
ti& the great popular masacs were so easily won owr 
by &c merely pIausib1e lures of the forward-pushing 
&oritics, why rhodd they be less accessible to idea 
that were the very reflex of their economic condition, 
nothing but the dcar, logical expression of their needs 
not yet understood and only vaguely sensed by them? 
Tme, this revolutionary disposition of the masses had 
most always, and often very soon, made way for lassi- 
tude or .even a rmcpal inta its opposite as soon as the 
illusion had bccn dispelled and disenchantment had 
#rma But here war not r case of Iurcs but one of the 
dnmcnt  of the very ink& of the gregt mmajotig 
ieself, interests then by no means clear to that majori~,  
but. which kon bad to become dear thmrrgh eon&ing 
dun&qtions in the coarse of the'ir rcalizaiion. And 
if then, as rhown in the third artidc of Mom, in the 
q r i n g j d  1850 dcielopments had concentrated thc real 
rub, paFer in. tbe ..boyrgpis republic that had m a -  
mted Prom &i''&drl? reklution sf 1848 k thc hands 
of the big.hrgcoisie, . ~h ich ,  . on top of all, entertained 
m a n h i & c '  desires, while ail orhcr sotid classes, 
peasants well as petty bourgeoisie, had becn gmuped 
rbout the proletariat in such manner that in case and 
after. a common victory not the bourgeoisie but the 
pmlctariat made way by experience would become h e  
decisive factor-in such case w e n  not the chances fa- 
voroblc for a reversion of the revolution of the miraoriq 
into the revolution of the majority? 
Mmy -has p r o d  us wrong and d others who 
thought similarly. It has made h r  that the of 
economic development on the Continent was thcn by m 
means ripe for the abolition of csrpitdist p r o d d w  ; k 
Bns proved this by the economic revo1ut.iun which, sinec 
1 8 ~ 8 ,  has afimed the entire Continent and bas * b t +  
duccd large industry in Fmm, Austria, w r y ,  
Polan4 md, more recently, k Ru~sia, and baa made 
of Gurnany an industrial country of the first tank--a?I 
*IS upon a capitalist basis which, reckoning from I 848, 
implies great gspmsivt capstdry. But it was jw this 
M w t M  rcvo1rrtion that has m r y ~ ~ h o r c  in- 
e h k y  in regard ta dnss relatims, which has elknhattd 
a  ma^ of hybrid forms taken wer from the period af 
mmrrfamre and, in Eastern Eut.opc, wen from grild 
which bar prukcd r real bourgmlie and 
r ml industrial proletariat md forced both into the ~~ of eodd evolda. Thereby haa the stqp 
fi b e e n  thme -0 gmt which in rQ8 
d d e  of h&itd only in Faris and, pedmce,  
h 8 fcw brgc industria1 centers, been sprtad over the 
whole of Europe, and has attained an & d t y  mthintr- 
in x848. We had then the many vgue sectarian 
cnagc1s with their pmcmr ; we have today thc one 
unipcdlp ~lrcceptcd, tmmparendp dew &wry of 
Ma=, sharply formdating the iid pfporu of the 
atmgglc. We had then the masses, divided sad diffe~ 
&cd according to focality end nrtidtp, h E  
oped, held W e r  only by r sense of t~mnwd 
rolftFiag, a i d t d y  drivcn hither md S i r  k m m  
I 
8, far fmm aiming the victory-by one fell blo;, it 
mt#t gradually proceed by hard, tenacious st- 11 
fmm hit iom to-position, it proved o m  for all hor 
bpdb1c it was in s 848 to bring about the sDcid ttaaac 
formation by s sheer coup de  mi^. 
Givm a bourgeoisie split in two dynastic--monarJI'tst 
but which above all things demanded tm 
@ty and security for its hancid tra~aceious, and . oppooed to it a defeated but still threatening proletariat 
about which petty bourgeois and peasant clanmts mwt 
and more grouped themselves--a permanent threat of 
vioknt outbreaks which, however, offered no prospect 
for the s o l u t i o d a t  was the situation almost ma& 
to order for the coup $itat of the third, the pseudo- 
dcmucwtic pretender, h i s  Bonapsrtc. By meam of 
the anny he made, on Dtcrmber 2, I 85 I ,  an d of the 
tassc situation and racurcd internal quiet to Europe 
only to beatow upon her a new era of war. Thc period 
of m l u t -  fm b&w had come to a dost for &c 
time being; thcre followed r period of rcvoIutim from 
above. 
Thc imperialist reaction of 1851 gave to us new 
- p m f  of the untipcness of the proletarian aspimtim 
of the timc. But &t reaction itself was to create the 
conditions under which they had to ripen. Xnterd 
tmquifity secured full development of the new kb 
trial prosperity, tbe necessity to provide work for the 
army md to divert the revo~onary Etlrreats *mta out- 
ward &mcb produccd tbe wars, whe& Bmapar&e, 
under the pretext of upholding the "principle of nation- 
diey," sought to gather in annexations for F m e .  His 
imitator, Bismarck, adopted the same policy. for Pms- 
sia: he ma& his coup $itat, his m h i t h  from 
above, in 1866, against the &man Bmd and -a, 
and no less against the Ptwrsian "wntlict&amber." 
Bat Europe was too and for two Bonapartcs, and so 
the irony of history willed it that Bismarck medrew 
Bonaparte, and that Kiag William of Prussia not only 
mstorcd the limited Gcnnrn empire but a h  the Frencb 
republic. The geneml rcilult wab howewr, that in 
Europe the independence and internal unity of the 
great nations, with the exception of Poland, had become 
a face. It had done so, of course, within re1ativcly 
m'odest limits - but at any rate so much so that the 
working dass process of development no longer was 
Jlampered by nationalist aomplicotba The gram 
diggers of the revolution of 1848 had becum thc ex- 
ecutors of its last wiU and testament. And, beside than, 
already rose threatening the heir of 1848, the p d e -  
tariat in its Internationale. 
After the war of 187*7r, Bonoparte disappears. 
from the stage and Bismarck's misrion ir hi&&, ro 
, that be can subside again to his statue of an ordinrry 
J&ker*. The tcrmhatioa of this period is formed 
the Panr Commu~e. A surreptitious sttempt by Thien 
to abstract from the Paris National Guard its cannon, 
s uprising. It was again shown that, 
,+ in Paris, no reva1ution is  possible other than a p r o b  
.. tarim one. Government fell, after the victory, into 
ing class, a11 by itself. And again it 
possible even then, twenty yean 
in our review, was &e d c  
, On the one hand, France left 
Paris in the lurch, looked on while it was bled to dearh 
under the bullets of MacMahon; on the other hand, 
&c ~~ consumed itself in a futile struggle bb 
es that split it, the Blanquists 
(&e majority ) , and the Proudhonists (the minority), 
wither of whom knew what was to be dona As sterile 
of 1848 was the gift-victory of 
With the Paris Commune, the militant proletariat 
was considered finally buried. But, on the mntrarf, 
from the Gmmune and the Fmnco-German war may , , bF dated-its most powerful rise. By the complete trans- b, 
formation of the methods of warfare, through the ccm 
stription of the mire population capable of bearing 
arms intrP armies that could thereafter be counted omlf 
by the millions, through fircams, projectiles and cxpb 
1- dvcs of hithem aahtarddf effdwncss, a audden end 
m a  made, on the one hand, of the Bonapadst period 
peaceful industrial dcvtlop 
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0th than r world war of m h d f  W I 
absolutely k h d a b l c  outtome. On tEpc 
&er hand, &is military t~formrrtion caused the . 
cost of maintaining these armies to rise in p~meprie 
pmgmmion, drove taxation to unat taWe heights 
and thereby the pourer c h ~  of the people into the 
arms of kidism The annexation of b~l iomtu,  :: 
ttic most immediate cause of the mad mmphtion in 1; . cterrwagc b ~~, might produce a dmmmt 
tween the Frcmh d the Gennan bowgdsie; but for 
the workeft of both camtries it famed + n~ar bond of 
don .  Thc amLivemay of the Pa& Cummum h e  
the Rtat  common f d v e  day for the entire prpletaria~ 
The war of 1 8 7 ~ 1  a d  the defeat of the €om - had, as pedimted by M46 the 
of gmvity of the European labor m#cmc& for the 
1 
tiare being, from Frame to Germany. h Frr&ee, of 
mume, ycam were mqdred to recover fmn dxc b W  
b b g  af May, Y 87 t . Ia Gemany, howcver, .whm 
mduatry fedized by the F m h  pnilliard 
*nnu dmebpcd with hot-houst rapidity, the k i d  De 
grcwsstill more rapidly and dtctivtly. T h d a  
tm fhc &cement with wtri& the mrkrs utilized the 
w g m d  f d w ,  htmdwcd in 1866, &c rsmd* 
@Mh of the party lies h bt#fab1e  figares 
-re all the ma. ~ 8 7 1 :  zoa,m; lt 874: us,- 
,877: ~ 3 , -  bid Damocmtic voter. T h  - 
in .&c &ape of the a n t k i a l i a t  law. For tlw 
mutt, the party was dispersed, the vote sank to 3 12,- 
aoo in 1881. But that was m n  ovefcome, and now, - 
d m  pressure of the exceptional law, without a pteop, 
Iritlmut a 1-1 organization, without the right of as= 
41, began the most rapid growth in spite of all. 
1884: 55u,wm; 1887: 763,000: raga: 1,427,ooo 
.ot# Then the hand of the State was lamed. The 
aothkcialist law vanished, the Socialist vote rose to 
1,7#7,ooo, more than a quarter of the entire vote cast. 
.The Government and the nJing classes had exhausted 
all their mwns-uselessiy, purposelessly, unsuccessfully. 
Tbc most palpable proofs of thcir own impotence whi& 
the authorities, from night watchman to chancellor, 
had been made to swaUow--and from the despised 
workers, at t h a t 4 e s e  proofs could be counted by the 
million. The State had got to the end of its rcsourccs, 
the workers were but at the beginning of theirs. 
Thc German workers had, moreover, rendcred to 
tbtir muse r second great service, bcsides the first of 
their mere existence as the strongest, the best d i d -  
phed and the most rapidly growing Socialist party; 
thcg had furnished their comrades in all counttics with 
a new and one of the ~harpest weapons, by showing 
h ' h o w  to utilize thc g m e d  fmnchisc. ' 
The general fnnehirc had for a long time existed 
ia F w ,  but had tbcre fallen into bad repute through 
the mirusc it bad been put to by the Bonrpartiat Gor- 
eratnent. After the Commune, there war m, l ab t  
prrrgiacxkumtoweit. b S p * i a , t o o , i t h t d d  
rim the republic, but in S p i n  a k d m  f& tnrLQ 
oa tbe part of dl serious oppoaithn partics had ever 
baen the &. Even the Swiss cxpcrknct with the p 
e d  fn&st bad been anyth'ing but m c ~ ~ & ~ g  bo I 
hbor party. The rcwIutionary workers of thc Llrtirr 
ccmtrics had got into the habit of looking upon thE 
f d w  as a pitfall, as m 'htrurnent for governme& 
Ell fh4mntt h Gcrmanp it m u  o t h e h .  W 
mtdst Manifesto had drca& prochimed the stm& 
for t ~ i e j p d  fia*~. for dem66-qL-f 
$-U-dLnmt i m p o m  tuL. of the matant pG 
Ef " -i& mEi-q-a piht. 
Bismarck rz to introdwcc the f n ,  
& u the w1t meam to i n t e  the ma- of the 
peoak in his p h ,  our workers immediately t d c  it up 
b n- d sent Augflst Bcbcl tn the ht d h m t  
m a s  =wed the workers of sll comtrica as an 
CIMPI~. They have used the f m d h c  and, in rbc 
wotdr of the Frtncb Marrim progrun, m w f d ,  
de  yen db dupe& qdic 1 el& jnsqt?kiI ;US- 
#&tcip~tion,i, c., have c b g d  it fmm * m 
instrument of -&~anctpqt~oil.  
no h e r  advatatqp, 
t h  bo p a m t m i &  
C 
ttintp of victory on the part of the workcts in the mame 
as well u 
of that of a11 opposing parties, and gave us thereby a 
puge fgr prqpoaioning our - action . . such as cannot - be _ 
% 
- -*- d licated, restrained us from untimely hesltatlon as 
weI as r 5 G  tmt;.rnely. darjng+if-thii-Gie th; i& 
gain derived from thc general franchise, it would be 
more than enough. But it has . done -. -. - much  more. Dur- 
ing the e$ction agitation, it furnished us i-iienii,  iuZb 
-4.- - ------- as there~~- no other, of-getting m touch with the mass# 
o s p c o p l e  that are still fa; temO~d,-E&:i&~of 
foxing ailparties to defend. theu-v iw-ad  & 
agahtaur a-kclu-brfore all. the peoph; and&&& 
tion, it fn_stde_acceg$bic. to. aur r .,cs in the 
Rcichstlga a-tribune from which t h x e a k  to &r 
nents in ~adiamtnt, a s  weIL as to -fhiasmd&- ogpo- - om, m& much greater authority and freedom thu 
mdd be done in the press and at mee&. --Uf 3 h ~  
a w a s s e  anti-Sociafist law to the Government and to 
the bourgeoisie i f  the election agitation and the Sociatiat 
sptechcs in the Reichstag constantly broke through it? 
With this successful utilization of the genem1 f r t a  
&st, an mtirely new method of the prs)k&m 
had mint into being and had qiickiy been buirt 
tt found that the State institutions, wherein 
the d e e  of the bourgcoiZ--if ~~~niz~.~'~-f- 
f i P r t h e r w  
- . .  - s ~ i & - o f  . -. which .- - the . - -  working -- 28 - 
dw, #a these same inntiions. We prfi 
ticiprtcd in the c l ~ o n s  to the Dim in the F e d t d  
St& Municipal Councillom, Industrial Coum; in 
mhoa we contested with the burge~isit  every post in 
the. @kg of which a sufficiently large part of the p+ 
Iaarirt had a nay. And so it came about that .boyr:. 
isie and-Go~-mo- ,ille I action of the worken' party, more the sue- - 4 o ~ d ~ n i X h a n  --- ebdlton. 
. .For here. the m a t h e  atl-1~ have 
d a l l y  been altered. 
the street &ht behind 
ga& t&c final decision, hnr become antiquated. 
Qt there he no illusions &bout this: r real v i a o ~  . 
&r.themilita~ in a street battle, a &tory as between 
FRO annica, belongs to the greatest rarities. But the 
hmrgmtru seldom phnn;d it that way. For &em 
it matter of disintegrating the tmok 
&rough moral influences which, in the- a s e  of a fight 
bEtPPcen thc armies of two warring muqtrrits, either did 
not come into play at all or, if so, ~II only minor degree. 
In case this 8uccct&, then thc troops fail their corn; 
manders, these lmt their heads and the insurdon 
wins. But if this does not s a m e 4  &en, even in case 
of numerical inferiority on the part of the military, the 
advantage of better equipment rrnd tmining, the unity 
of eommand, the wcll-phnncd application of the fa- 
rt hand, d i s c i p l i d  that comes into play. The+& - 
most Le insurmtion can ncmmplish io a 
r 
btbt r rr 0f 8 b S ~ d ,  
* ~ r s r b e c b ' ~ u d t b e o u O ~ ~  
bIbort, tht which is needed for the merc deftme of r 
section of a city, to say nwhing of the whole of k, the 
i-ble cooperation md dovetailing of the q r -  
ate emmmnda can be attained in b~ d mtp#1m, 
oftcn not at all. The cmcmtration of battle fo- 
rrpoli one decisive point is thtrcby made impodbk. 
Thus, passive resistance k m c s  & prtvrilirrg form of 
& w e .  T h e  o % m k  will here and there h e  to 
- h J  attacks and %lLttJLiil% movcmmm, but tbc 
rdc wiU be to d n c  itself to the -tion of p& 
tiww abdoaed by rctmating troops A M  to this, 
tbm i~ on thc side of the military the control of l a w  
ord3#nce and of f d y  quipped o d  thoroughly trained 
&betring troops, means of combat w h i  the imr- 
garcs lack in most every case. No wmder that h r h k  
rondueted with the gratest heroism--Patit, 
firte, t 848; Vicnna, Qctober, 1848; Dresden, May, 
rh- with the defeat of the inw~oction, as 
mui as the attacking Ieuders, u n h p t r e d  by politicpl 
eorrridcmtions, proceeded f iwn purely military paints 
of view md their soldiers remained dcpcndablc. 
The mamema =essts of the insumta, of 18+8 
arc due to many re-. In Paris, Jdy, a834 and 
Fcbmary, 1848, as well as in most Spanish street bat- 
tles, thek stmd bemten the insurg&ts and the mili- 
tary a citizens' pard, w b i  either went directly orcr 
to the side of h e  tlprisii, or through a lukewarm *b 
I &isbe attitude caused the troops to waver rurd, ;eg top of tbrrt, furnished arms to the iasurdm ewer this citizms' guard at the very tmk a s t d  against the insurrection, as in Paris, June, 1 8 4 ,  tk httet was quctltd. In Bedin, 1848, h e  p p h  partly because of -the accretion of cm&dedh nnr 
fa- during the night and the mo* of the rptb d 
March, pattiy h u s c  of the uhaust4m and the poor 
provisioning of the troops, and, W y ,  because of t[le 
hmcd . In every instance, the w h q  w 
because thc failed, because the comraudm 
Wed W o n ,  or bemuse their b& were titd 
: Thcrcforc, m n  during the Ja& period of smct 
b a t k ,  the barricade bad a moral mther dun r msb 
A1 effect. It was a m#ns to rhrdct the zol idi~ d tht 
military. If it hdd until that bad been accmplbhd, 
tbe Piaorywas ma; if not, it incant defeat. 
Almdyin 1 8 ~ d w c h ~ o f m c c s s w u u i . t h c r  
poor. Everywhere had the burgeoidc over ta 
the d& of the governments, "dturc and -n 
greed and feted the miliury mading out ag&st tbt 
d o n s .  Thc barricade hrd tolr in cham; tb;l 
soldier saw bthi it no longer "the people," k t  dds ,  
agitators, plunderers, divide- the dregs of society; the ! 
officer had in thc coum of time become familiar with 
the tactical forms of the street bade; no longcr &d.hc, I 
nu& in direct line and without cover upon the impm 
vised breastworks, but o d a k t d  them thw gm ' 
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&M, .aourta and houses; and that succeeded now with 
m n ~  MI in nine c a w  mt of ten. . . 
,Since then, much more has been changed, all fa- 
ror the military. If the cities have become Iargcr, 
mhavt the armies. Paris and Berlin, since I 848, ham 
qwirup1td, hut their garrisons haw grown more thrp 
that. These garriscns, by means of the railroads, rniy 
be doubled inside of twenty-four hours, and in f o p .  
tight boun may swell to gigantic armies. The am*,  
m t  of thenc cnormoudy augmented troops has become 
krnparab1y more cfirctive. In 1848 the smooth-. 
bore, muzzleloaded percussion rifle, today the d 
caliber, magazine breech loader, shooting four t i m  a s  
far, .ten times as accurately and ttn h s  as quidy ?I 
the f o ~ e r .  At that time the solid pr~je~tiles and 
case shot of the artillery with relatively weak effect, 
today the percussion shell, one of which suCces to shat- 
ter the best barricade. Then the pickaxe of the pioneer 
to break through &e fire wds, today the dynamite 
carcridgc. 
On eht side of the insurgents, howcv~r, all the POP 
ditions have become worse. An uprising wbtmith dl 
layen of the population sympathize will hardly come 
agak; in the class stmggIt the middle layers will hardy 
ever group thcm~cJves around the proletariat so f a y  
that the party of reaction, gathering around the bour- 
geoisie, wil l  be almost eclipsed by comparison. The 
"ptoplc'' will for that reason always appear dividd, 
d thus a powerhd lever, so effective in r 848, will bc 
nlirriag. ErenifOatbCrideoftbciwrvractioRhtt 
be mrt crlid roldiec+, it dl bGcome more d i w t  
toamthan.  T h e h r m t i n g u t d q o ~ r i h a f t h e  
wa- if the pdia h a  we d e r e d  them 
6 by the m o d  of a part of the m-w 
mr mPtch for &e mag&ne ri0e of the d t r  cvm at 
dont quartem. Up to 1848 one mdd m& his oanr 
ammunition out of powder and lead, today the cart- 
ridge for each rifle model varies, bting s * d r  d y  in 
that all of them arc the product of law iadurtry a d  
not to IIC extemporized, which renders most dts use- 
less unless one h the a@al mmtrnitim m.de for 
them. And, W y ,  the newly-built purrten of the 
large &a, erecetd aince 1848, have beea laid out in 
long, straight and wide streets aa though made to order 
for the effective w e  of ~ A C  new cannon rrnd riflm. The 
revoIFltionarg, who woutd h i d  dcct  the new work- 
i a g ~ d h i c t s i n t h c  northmdeaatof Be& for a 
barricade battk, would haw to be a lrimtk 
Docs the reader now lutdcrstrnd why the nriirrg 
classes, by hook or by -Or, w d d  get us where tht 
ride p o p  and the sabre dashes? Why, today, do thty 
charge us with cowardice became we will not, without 
further ado, get down into &e street &ere we arc 
sure of our defeat in advance? Why are we so pemis- 
tcntly importutlcd to p i g  the role of camon fodder? 
Thc gentltmeu arc wasting their imp- as 
well as their pmvocatiom all in v a k  WE arc wt 
quite so silly, They might as well a& of their 4- 
in the next war to face them in the line formation of 
Frederick XI, ot in the columns of whole diGsions a la 
W~tgmm and Watcrho, and with the old m-andwn 
gtm ia hand, at that. The time is past for rtwlutiona 
carried through by small minorities at the head of 
~ m c o ~ o u i r  masses. When it gcta to be a matter of 
the mnpIete transformation of the social organizstion, 
the masses thmsetves must participate, must under- 
stand what is at stake and why they are to act. That 
much the histoq of tbe last 6fty pears has taught us. 
3d so that the masses may asderstand what is to be 
done, long and persistcat work is required, and it is 
this work that we arc now performing with results that 
drive our enemies to despair. 
In thc ]Latin countries, too, it is being realized that 
the old tacticg must be rwised. Everywhere, the Ger- 
man example of the ueilieation of the franchise and of 
the conquest of a11 possible positions has been imitated. 
In France, where the SOU has been raked ap for more 
than a hundred years by revolution after revolution, 
where not r single party exists that has not done ih part 
in coasp~cs,  inmrrdons and in all other r m 1 ~  
tioiary d o n s ;  in Frame, where because thereof the 
anny ir by no mtana certain for the government, and 
where, generally speaking, the conditions for an insur- 
rectionary coup d# mrtin art much more favorable than 
ia Gtmmy-cvm in France the Suchliars realize more 
d more that no h b l e  success is po&bI:e dtss they 
win over in advance the great mma of the peoptt, 
b nhkh, in this case, mclm the pcasmh. The slow WQ& 
of propaganda sad parliamentary activity a~ Irere also 
mognizcdrrrrthcncxttaslcofthc~~ -did 
not fail to come. Mat only has a whole d m  of hfw 
SicipaI &uncih been c o - 4  but in the C h d x r  
there am fiftp =&-, lrnd I- already 
t h m  t h e e  Migiarieg md oac P k d m  of the 
Republic. In Belgim, the workera hawe kst y a r  con- 
quered the franchise, md have won in one qmrttr of 
the eIdm district& In SaPitzerlrmd, Italy, acanwr&, 
rye, evcn in Bulgaria and Rumania, tbe Wtb arc 
rcp-cd in the respective Parfiamcnts. XII Austria 
d partier ore agreed that accaa to the ~ c k r a t  mn 
noXoagcrbedenicdm. Thatwtshdgahaccmb 
csrtdn,aadtheonly q w h a a t i m e  Lth-which 
door. Even in Rumin, d e n  the dcbmted Zumkij 
h b r  is i d e -  National h b l y  + 
which the young Nicholas hrrs so minly baHtc&-cptn 
thcrewcmorp~nwithce~fai i t ty .datwcshaUbe 
rep-& 
Of c o r n  our comrades abmod h v c  not o , b  
doncd tbc right to tooltttion. The right to mmlwh 
b, in the hat anal* the only rul "historic right*' 
a p n w b i c h a U ~ m ~ t ~ ~ t R i t h w t ~  
even M c d d e n b ~  where tht fop01rxtim of 
tbc a d l i l y  was t&ed in rvS5 &mu& the "in&- 
h a g r c c m ~ "  tht gIoriow c o m f i ~  af feu&- 
im d i d  tbis wrp day. The right ao -1:&0il jr 
thoKwrghty recognized in the inner d m e m  of 
man, tbot even G a d  von BogPrlrwaki dcducea from 
dhp@arr igbtoloacthc~#dutrrhedytovb 
&ate his Kaiser. 
h e w e r ,  happen what may in h e r  couuttics, the 
6 c m  M d  h 0 h  8 &C p0dtiotl mdd, 
for that ream and for the t'unc being, faces a specific 
tUt 7'hc 2,000,000 voters whom it sen& to the 
ht#tings, plus the young mcn a d  women non-vatem 
standing behind them, these form the most numerous, 
tht most compact "shack troops" of the international 
proletarian army. This maw already furnishes mom 
than 25 per cent of the total vote cast; 4, as shown 
by the special e l d o n  for the Reidmag, the Diet tlec- 
tiom in the several States, the Municipal Council and 
the Industrial Court electima, it is growing apace an- 
intemptcdy. Its growth is so apontpncow, so steady, 
so irresistible and pet at the apme timc is quict as that 
of P natural process. All governmental interferenc~ 
with it has proved futile. Today, we may figore with 
a,aas,ooo voters. If this goes on, we shall at the dose 
of the century win over the greater part of the mid& 
social layers, petty bourpiaie as well u mall peasants, 
and we shall mme to bt the decisive pwcr  in the land. 
before which all other poarcm most bow whcther they 
like it or not. To keep going this growth without 
hemption mtil it swunps the d i n g  g o v e r n m d  
system, that is our main task And there is but me 
means whereby the steadily sweWhg growth of the miti- 
tant Socialist forces in Gtnnany could for the moment 
b e ~ e d , o r m u l d e v c n f a r e e i m c h & - W :  
a mEsim on a large d e  with thc military, r b b &  
lettinglikerhatof 1871 inParis. h t h e l o n g r q t h  
m m d d  be overcome. To shoot out of &cc a 
party numbering millions, that is not M b l c  wich all 
the magazine rifles in Europc wd hh. But nor- 
d devclopmeot d d  be hindered, th decision 
delayed, pmlongcd and bwpIed 4th hcaeg s a c h k e ,  
The irony of history tarns cverphbg @dc diem, 
We, the "rcv01utio~s4" the "upsettem," we thrive 
much better with -I than with iltcgal m t w  in f d n g  
an averthrow. The parties of order, as they dl them- 
artlves, perish bmuac of the IcgiJ. mditioars set up by 
themselves. With Odilm Barrot tbcy cry out m da- 
+I: b Upli J #ous ~+lq@ty ir our death-while 
we with this same lcgality acquire mdhg mudm and 
red checks and bok the picture of health. And if we 
are not insane enough to favor them by letting them 
drive us into street battle, nothing will in the end be 
left to than but thcmselvcs to break through the legality 
that is  so fatal to them 
Meantime, they arc grind'mg out new laws winst 
the revohtion. &in, e v e r p h i  has been set up head 
.down. Tht fanatics of anti-revohtion of todayi are 
aet they t h d v e s  the revolutionists of yeaterdlrg? 
Did we perchance bring about tbe civil war in 18661 
Did we depose and drive away fmn their a n c d  
lagithate realms thc Ki of Hjlawver, thc Hucwr of 
Hesse, the Duke of Nassau and amex their patho- 
Ipid domhims? And these destroyem of the German 
M Md of three crowns bestowed by the Grace of 
Gd m p l a h  about rmlution? I Quis &rir Grac- 
ckar dc seditbne querenses ? - Who could permit the 
~ ~ p p c n ~  of Bismarck to revile the revolution? 
I& them force through their mti-rmlution& 
lcgirhtion, make it even woke and transform the entire 
paarrl code into caoutchouc, they will accomplish naught 
but a new demonstration of their impotence. Seriody 
to assail the Social Drmocracy, they will have to haye 
rccoune to entirely diaerent measures. The Social- 
Democratic revolution, which is getting on first rate 
while abiding by the Iaw, t h q  an only get at by m n s  
of a revciIution made by the law and order party, which 
cannot live without breaking the law. Herr Rwler, 
the Prussirn bureaucrat, and Herr voa Boguslawski, 
thc Prusdan general, haw shown &em the ody way 
to get at the workers, who refuse to be lured into a 
street bade,-violation of the constitution, dictator- 
ship, back to absolutism, regis erokrarru, srrptcm k x I  
Take heart, gentlemen, here no pursing of the lips will 
do, htrc you must whistle 1 
But do not forget that the German Reich, l i e  ail 
m11tr German States, and, indeed, like all modern 
States, is the product of a covenant; first, of a covenant 
among the rulers thmsdves, and, second, of a covenant 
of the ruler with the people. If one party breaks the 
agreement, the whole of it falls, the other party being 
no longer bound by it. 
Now &nost r ,6m yeam ago, there was at work in 
the Roman cmpirc a drngeruus m1utionary It 
undermined religion and all the foundatiom of the 
State; it denied point blank that thc emperor'r dl waa 
the highest law, it was without a hthdd, inter-1 . 
national, it spread out over the entire r d m  from Gad 
to h i p ,  and evcn beyond the bordch of the empire. k 
had long worked mderground snd in semcy, but had, 
for some time, felt strong enough to come out openly 
in the light of day. Thii mlutionary party, h 
under the name of Christians, a h  had iep- 
tarion in thr: ormy; cntirc legions were composed of 
Christians. When thy were commanded to amad the 
sacrificial ceremonies of the Pagan d i s h e d  church, 
&re to serve as a guard of honor, the revolutionary 
soldiem went so far in their insolmcc as to fasts 
special syrnbol~rorrm-on heir helmets. The m- 
tomary disciplinary barn& measures of their officers 
proved fruitless. The emperor, Diodetian, auld no 
longer quietIy look on and see how order, obedience 
a d  discipline were undermined in his army. He acted 
cnergcticalIy whit there was yet time. He p m d -  
gated an an t i -Soc ihLeg  p a r d o ~ n  rmnd-CWisn 
Irw. The meetings of the revolutionaries were pmhib'tt- 
e 4  their meeting phccs were dosed or e m  demoliicd, 
the Christian symbols, crosses, em, were forbidden as 
in Saxony they forbid red pocket handkerditfs. The 
Christians were declared unfit to hold o6ce in the h t c ,  
they could not even become corporals. h 4  as 
they did not st tbat t h e  have judges wcU &Ned aa to 
the "reputation of r person," such as Herr KoItcr's 
* .  
a u t A d m  law prcauppes, the Christians were sim- 
ply forbidden to seek their rights in a court of law. But 
this exceptional law, too, remained inefectivc. In dc- 
&me, the Christians tore it from the walb, yea, it is 
said that at Nikomedir they fired the emperor's palace 
over his head. Then the latter revenged himself by 
means of a great persecution of Christians in the year 
303 A. D. This was the fast persecution of its kind. It 
was so effective that, seventeen yean later, the -army 
was composed largely of Christians, and that the next 
autocratic ruler of the entire Roman empire, Constmm 
tine, called "the Great" by the clericals, proclaimed 
Christianity as the religion of the State. 
London, March 6, 1895, 


MIHTABISM OB WDUSTBUL m o r n ?  
& W D . L I B I *  
S i  the closing of ttie d i d o n  "Aa to -Polihl' 
was mnouaced in these wlrmms a mmspondmt, who 
prefers not to have his mme publishea sent in this gaes- 
tim: 
"I'm no 'pure and ~*unplc pofitical S o c h l i ~ '  as you 
will set; and I[. am no 'pare and simple phPs;d-fo&h' 
aa you will dso ate. I Mieve  with yon that p l i b I  
action is noceissary. Thc Labor Mavcmmt may Rot 
step down from the plane of civilized methods. If it 
did, none would be better suited than our capitalist nm- 
tcm X hope I'vc set myseIf clear on that score. I ~rb 
Mielre with poll h t  the bdot is just so much papar 
h w n  away, without the physid fom to back it up, 
or, m you have neat?y said, 'to e a f ~  the Ri* that 
the ballot proclaim! I've set myscif drar on that 
SCBR a h ,  I hope. 
"Now, what I want to know is this : Does it fofiow, 
as yon seem to tbinb that we must have the Induatria! 
W&ts of the World, I mean scn h d d d  Union, to 
supplement the ballot? I think not. I t h i i  wc &odd 
-tt ow &arts, instead of dividing them. Why 
h i d d  we divide our efforts, and our mwty, and orrx  
tinag h e n  a politid and an economic organization? 
I'll n b c h  the Letter BWL" 
T h e  answer merita more thorough than oflthmd 
treatment in the Lcttcr Box. Both the question and the 
m w c t  will fitly supplement the discmion which doste 
, in this issue with the answers to Rice's questions. 
What our correspondent desires is to avoid r di+ 
$ion of energy. A wise desire. Does his plan anrswer 
lh desire? Evidently he fails to see that it does not. 
The only interpretation his p h  admib of is the organ- 
izing of a military, of an armed force to back up thc 
revolutionary balIot. The division of energy is not 
avoided* It is o d y  transferred to an armed, instead of 
to an c m d c  organization. 
Seeing that, in either case, the evil of divided entr- 
gics is iocurred, and cannot be escaped, the question re 
wlves itself into thtewhich of the two organizations 
is it preferable to divide energies with, the economic or 
the ditary? 
A tnilitary organization implies not one, or two, it 
implies i number of dings. Bombs, explosives, gener- 
ally, may be left out of the rcckonhg. They may be 
of incidental, but not of excludvc, use by an organized 
f axe* 
First of all powder is needed. The best of powder 
needs bullets and balls to do the business. The bmt of 
powder, Wets and balls are udcss without guns. Nor 
art inferior guns of much u n i I  when pitted agorimt the 
eptdate at the command of the capitalist claw 
The military organization of the rtdutionary pmIm- 
riat will need the most effectivt weapon The q w t i ~ i l  
has often been asked from capitalist sources, Where 
will you get the money from to buy the railmads and 
the other capitalist plants? The question i s  silly. No I 
one pmposes, nor will &ere be ang occasion, to "buy" 
t h e  thing. Not silIy, however, but extremely pcr- 
tinent, is the question, Where will the proletariat get 
the billions needed to purchase such a military equip- I 
Suppose the b&ns be forthcoming, Weapons, in 
the hands of men d H e d  in their use, are dangerous, 
primarily, to those who hold than. Numbers, unddcd 
in military evolutions, only stand in one mother's way. 
Wkrt  and how could these numbers practice in the USE 
I 
of their a m ,  and in the military drill? Where and 
how d d  they do the t w ~  things in secret? In public, 
, it would be out of yestion. 
Suppose, M y ,  that the problem of the billions 
were wlved, and the atiU more instperable pmb1m of 
exercise and 'drill be overtome. Supposs the military 
organization of the proletariat took the field and tri- 
~umphcd. And then-it would irmatdiately have to & 
solve- Not only will it not have been able to afford 
:the hddcatal protection that the revolutionary union 
lmdd afford to the proletariat whii  gettiqg ready, but 
dl its implements, all the money that it did mst, d the 
tricks it will have learned, and thc time consumed in 
em, will bt absolutely loat Its swords d 
'have to be turned into pruning hooks, im guns into 
phughharts, its h i e d g e  to be unlearned. 
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HOW would things stand with the i n t e g d y  or- 
&zed Industrial Union? 
Erst, its cost  is t r i h ,  positively witbin mach ; 
Seeondy, every scrap of information it gathers 
while organt'i is of permanent value; 
Thudly, it wi l l  be able to offer mistark8 Cnpitd 
ist encroachments, and thereby to act as a breastwork 
for its members, while getting ready; 
Fourthly, and most significant and determhbg ofi 
ail, the day of its triumph will be the begbhg  of the2 
MI exercise of its functionwhe administration of the 
productive forces of the Nation. 
The fourth consideration is siflcant and deter- 
mining. It is the consideration that Socid Evolution 
points the finger to, dictating the coumt that the prole- 
tariat must take;--dictating its god;--dictating its 
#rcccns. The proletariat, whose emnomic badge k p v -  
erty ; the proletariat, whose badge, the first of dl rev- 
olutionary classes, is economic impotence ,-for the 
benefit of that class, apparently treated so stepmotherly 
by Social Evolution, Social Evolution has wrought aa it 
has wrought for none other. It has builded the smithy 
of capitalist industrial concentration; and, iu keeping 
with the lofty mission of the Working Class to abolish 
dasa d e  on earth, Social Evolution has gathered rcady 
for the fashioning, not the implements of destdon, 
but the implements of future peace, withal the most pm 
tent weapon to dear the field of the capitait  despot- 
the irtdtr.tt&Oj raxked toihs, The integrally organized 
Industrial Lnion is the weapon that M a l  Evolution 
placcs within the' grasp of the proletariat as the means 
for their emancipation. 
Division of energy being unavoidable, can there be 
any doubt what organization should divide the energies 
of the proletariat with their political organization-the 
military or the Industrial? 
"DANIEL DE ,LEONw 
THE MAN AND HIS WORK 
A biYWOSmY 
16 ml Uloltrrtba 
Daniel Dc Leon w u  a pio- 
neer among men. He 14s 
the torch bearer, the artier 
oi r new idea in a laud where 
tbe capitalist clasu had be- 
come powerful ahoat be- 
yond comprehenrion; whet* 
the corroding iafluenccs of 
the capitalist system had de- 
vitalized and turned to i t s  
owu unea gucb an there ms 
of r labor movcmenf Dc 
Iaoll battled during hir Ions 
and nacful lift again~t thtnt 
corrupting and corroding in- 
dlueneea, and whiie figb ting, 
he formulated tbc tactics 
necded in the workers' 
struggle for cmmeiptfon. 
He formulated the idea of 
mdu*trial Socidist society, minting !o the partly traasitory 
nature of the political state, empbasirlng t h e  and again !he 
pregnant truth that if civilization is to continue ia ib onward 
march, the working class of the world malt rear the new Re- 
public of Labor, and that tbe woof and tha warp, so to speak, 
of the mew mocial fabric, must be wrought in wordawe 6 t h  
the occupational or industrial mould of preacatda rocicty, 
rith an indottrial administration, or an Industrial &dl. to 
take thf place of rht antiquated state mchiattp,  He Frthtr 
t m p h e d  tht necessity of the workers' UQW p r w n g  to 
build that new society by ormdhg iato i a d r u M  amom+ 
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